The role of principal-agent in corporate financialization and green innovation

被引:2
|
作者
Huang, Yijing [1 ,2 ]
Xu, Zongyu [3 ]
机构
[1] Macao Polytech Univ, Fac Humanities & Social Sci, Macau 999078, Peoples R China
[2] Sanda Univ, Business Sch, Shanghai 201209, Peoples R China
[3] Shanghai Univ, Sch Management, Shanghai 200444, Peoples R China
关键词
Corporate financialization; Green innovation; Internal control; Equity incentives;
D O I
10.1016/j.frl.2024.105391
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper explores the relationship between corporate financialization and green innovation with a sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2012 to 2022. It is found that the crowding-out effect of corporate financialization on green innovation is greater than the reservoir effect, thus inhibiting green innovation. However, internal control capability and equity incentives can alleviate principal-agent conflicts and prompt corporate managers to reduce the negative impacts of financialization on green innovation in the long run, further revealing the decision-making process of how corporate managers weigh short-term financial interests against long-term innovation development.
引用
收藏
页数:8
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