Principal-agent Issues

被引:0
|
作者
Lukac, Jakub [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Econ Bratislava, Fac Business Management, Dept Corp Finance, Dolnozemska Cesta 1, Bratislava 85235, Slovakia
关键词
principal-agent issues; agency problems; principal-agent theory;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Principal-agent problem is relatively new issue mainly in large corporations. It arises due to the separation of ownership and management. Basic financial objective of any company is to maximise market value, but the interests of owners and managers are quite different. Shareholders like a high profit and high share price, but managers pursue their own interests like prestige, income, pleasant work and other benefits. Both of the parties have other information-managers are generally better informed, but owners bear risk of their decisions. Although the owners have information about company's results, they are not able to measure the performance and effort of their managers. The aim of this article is to refer to general principal-agent issues.
引用
收藏
页码:199 / 204
页数:6
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Principal-Agent Issues in Real Estate Funds and Joint Ventures
    Pagliari, Joseph L., Jr.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, 2015, : 21 - +
  • [2] A principal-agent problem
    Zhang, Xu-Bo
    Zhang, Zi-Gang
    Chen, Zi-Lin
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF 2007 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GREY SYSTEMS AND INTELLIGENT SERVICES, VOLS 1 AND 2, 2007, : 1293 - 1296
  • [3] Principal-agent learning
    Boylu, Fidan
    Aytug, Haldun
    Koehler, Gary J.
    [J]. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS, 2009, 47 (02) : 75 - 81
  • [4] Principal-agent Issues in Asset Acquisition: UK Institutions and their Investment Agents
    Mcallister, P.
    Hughes, C.
    Gallimore, P.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF PROPERTY RESEARCH, 2008, 25 (04) : 269 - 283
  • [5] Wealth and the principal-agent matching
    Fagandini, Paulo
    [J]. MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, 2022, 43 (02) : 555 - 568
  • [6] PRINCIPAL-AGENT MAINTENANCE PROBLEM
    KRINSKY, I
    MEHREZ, A
    [J]. NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS, 1989, 36 (06) : 817 - 828
  • [7] Principal-Agent VCG Contracts
    Lavi, Ron
    Shamash, Elisheva S.
    [J]. ACM EC '19: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION, 2019, : 783 - 783
  • [8] A principal-agent model of corruption
    Groenendijk, N
    [J]. CRIME LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 1997, 27 (3-4) : 207 - 229
  • [9] Principal-Agent Boolean Games
    Hyland, David
    Gutierrez, Julian
    Wooldridge, Michael
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, IJCAI 2023, 2023, : 144 - 152
  • [10] Fairness in a principal-agent problem
    Gustafsson, M
    Fujii, S
    Gärling, T
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, 2000, 35 (3-4) : 379 - 379