Optimal investment of distribution energy resources via energy performance contracts: An evolutionary game approach

Investment in distributed energy resources (DERs) is crucial for the expansion of distribution networks. However, traditional methods often lack comprehensive project management throughout their entire lifecycle and precise matching between distribution network operator (DNO) and energy consumer (EC) at the investment level. To address these issues, this paper proposes a novel investment model based on energy performance contracts (EPCs). Three EPC mechanisms are introduced: energy shared savings model (ESSM), energy guaranteed saving model (EGSM), and energy cost trust model (ECTM). Additionally, DERs investment strategies under EPC mechanisms are proposed to satisfy full-process management of project and precise matching between EC and DNO. The investment and operation problem is solved by an evolutionary game theory that ensures bounded rational agent to achieve satisfactory expected returns through repeated dynamic games. Results from the case study of an actual urban 37-bus system demonstrate that different EPC mechanisms are suitable for various scenarios depending on the EC's profit demand and project scale. The proposed model provides a comprehensive framework for DERs investment, considering the interests of both DNO and EC, and promotes the optimal expansion of distribution networks in a more practical and effective manner.