Impact of corporate governance on tax avoidance

被引:0
|
作者
Salehi, Mahdi [1 ]
Jabbari, Sahar [1 ]
Hosseiny, Zeynab Nourbakhsh [2 ]
Khargh, Fatemeh Eslami [1 ]
机构
[1] Ferdowsi Univ Mashhad, Dept Accounting Econ & Adm Sci, Mashhad, Iran
[2] Tech & Vocat Univ TVU, Accounting, Tehran, Iran
关键词
corporate governance; tax avoidance; tax management; AUDIT COMMITTEE; AGGRESSIVENESS; FIRM;
D O I
10.1002/pa.2929
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
In light of the pivotal role that taxes play as a primary source of income, particularly within developing economies, this study aims to examine the influence of various corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on tax avoidance. We employ three proxies to measure tax avoidance or tax management within companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). The CG mechanisms under scrutiny encompass board size and independence, CEO duality, auditor type, common stock ratio of at least 5% to total stock, managers' common stock holdings about total stock, gender diversity, manager ownership value, board meeting frequency, CEO stock ownership percentage, institutional shareholders' stock holdings, audit committee membership, and financial specialization. This research investigates 192 companies listed on the TSE, utilizing data available on the TSE website from 2011 to 2021. Our findings indicate that while several CG mechanisms, such as board size and independence, audit firm size, gender diversity, institutional ownership, and the specialization of audit committee members, serve to reduce tax avoidance, CEO duality exacerbates it. Moreover, profitability, financial leverage, and capital significantly inhibit tax avoidance. In contrast, the return on assets (ROA), economic growth, and inflation have a pronounced positive association with tax avoidance. A notable constraint of this study lies in its exclusive focus on publicly listed firms, driven by the availability of relevant information. This study offers valuable insights into the three dimensions of tax avoidance and their interaction with CG mechanisms, with implications for performance monitoring.
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页数:16
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