Intangibles and management earnings forecasts

被引:1
|
作者
Khallaf, Ashraf [1 ,3 ]
Kannan, Yezen [2 ]
机构
[1] Amer Univ Sharjah, Sharjah, U Arab Emirates
[2] Zayed Univ, Dubai, U Arab Emirates
[3] Amer Univ Sharjah, Sch Business Adm, POB 26666, Sharjah, U Arab Emirates
关键词
Voluntary disclosures; Management earnings forecasts; Intangibles; Information asymmetry; Uncertainty; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INTANGIBLES; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE; ANALYST COVERAGE; VALUE-RELEVANCE; VALUATION; ASSETS; CONSERVATISM; RECOGNITION;
D O I
10.1016/j.cjar.2024.100361
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate how the accounting treatment of intangible assets on managers' likelihood of issuing voluntary earnings guidance (MEF). We find that unrecognized intangibles (immediately expensed) are negatively associated with MEF issuance, while recognized intangibles (capitalized) show a positive association. These findings hold across various factors such as analysts' coverage, industry type and for a subsample that excludes software firms permitted to capitalize software development costs under SFAS No. 86. In additional, we investigate the cross-sectional determinants of MEF issuance based on the characteristics of firm intangibility. We find a significant increase in the likelihood of MEF issuance for higher unrecognized intangibles with greater earnings uncertainty. This suggests that managers may prioritize delivering valuerelevant information to market participants to alleviate uncertainty. (c) 2024 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY -NC -ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
引用
收藏
页数:20
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