The paper examines two of the most influential approaches to the problem of the justification of perceptual knowledge: representationalism and direct realism, taken in a version of epistemological disjunctivism. The problem itself can be represented as the need to demonstrate that there is a logical connection between a statement about the perception of a certain fact, p, and a statement about the knowledge of p. The article notes that both approaches face the problem of "the silence of the senses." This problem was pointed out by Ch. Travis, who tried to show that the content of sensory experience is not propositional; senses themselves do not tell us what fact we are dealing with when perceptually interacting with the world. The first part of the article reconstructs the argument from looks that Travis proposed to criticize representationalism. This part demonstrates that we cannot accept representationalism as an approach in the philosophy of perception that successfully overcomes the shortcomings of sense data theory. The main drawback of this theory was its adherence to the myth of the given-the idea that in perceptual experience we are dealing with non -propositional, non -conceptual "raw" data. The second part of the paper notes that Travis's argument can also be directed against such a version of direct realism as epistemological disjunctivism, since according to representatives of this theory, the content of veridical perceptual experience, being identical with the perceived state of affairs, is propositional. This part also analyzes the response to Travis from such a representative this theory as J. McDowell. While McDowell rejects propositionalism, he nevertheless insists that the content of perceptual experience must be regarded as conceptual. It allows us to avoid the myth of the given. In conclusion, criticism of McDowell's approach from the phenomenological position taken H. Dreyfus is discussed, and it is noted that McDowell's conceptualism is quite compatible with both phenomenology and enactivism. The enactivist understanding of perception that we find in McDowell leads us to accept the enactivist account of perceptual knowledge, where the foundation of knowledge action, i.e. something epistemically groundless.
