True lies and attempted lies

被引:1
|
作者
Viebahn, Emanuel [1 ]
机构
[1] Free Univ Berlin, Berlin, Germany
关键词
Lying; subjectivism about lying; objectivism about lying; true lies; attempted lies; lying and falsity;
D O I
10.1080/0020174X.2024.2365878
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
Sometimes speakers try to lie and inadvertently assert something true. Subjectivists about lying hold that such speakers are lying despite telling the truth. Objectivists hold that such speakers are not lying: they try to lie but fail. The first aim of this paper is to point to novel cases supporting subjectivism that do not involve speakers inadvertently asserting something true. Its second aim is to use these and other cases to explore the distinction between lying and trying to lie. Which factors can thwart an attempt at lying? In which situations do we judge that a speaker has tried to lie but failed? Attending to these questions not only offers insights into the act of lying, but also helps to scrutinise the objectivist strategy of explaining away intuitions about apparent cases of lying while telling the truth.
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页数:12
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