Bargaining and rent seeking: Asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels

被引：0
|
作者：
Imai, Haruo [1 ]
机构：
[1] Kyoto Univ, Sakyo, Kyoto 6068501, Japan
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2024年 / 240卷
关键词：
Bargaining; Rent-seeking; SSPE; MAJORITY-RULE; BARON;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111776
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider a Baron-Ferejon-type bargaining model with recognition probabilities determined by a Tullock contest. The contest is conducted once -and -for -all before bargaining a la Yildirim (2010). It is known that for ex -ante symmetric players, there are no symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in pure investment strategies. Here, we show the existence of an asymmetric SSPE, when players are sufficiently patient.
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