The Effect of Incentives in Nonroutine Analytical Team Tasks

被引:3
|
作者
Englmaier, Florian [1 ]
Grimm, Stefan [1 ]
Grothe, Dominik [1 ]
Schindler, David [2 ]
Schudy, Simeon [3 ]
机构
[1] Ludwig Maximilian Univ Munich, Munich, Germany
[2] Tilburg Univ, Tilburg, Netherlands
[3] Ulm Univ, Ulm, Germany
关键词
SOCIAL PREFERENCES; MORAL HAZARD; FIELD; CREATIVITY; SCHEMES; MARKET; BEHAVIORALIST; TOURNAMENTS; MOTIVATION; SELECTION;
D O I
10.1086/729443
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Despite the prevalence of nonroutine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is understood regarding how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams working on such a task. We document a positive effect of bonus incentives on performance, even among teams with strong intrinsic motivation. Bonuses also transform team organization by enhancing the demand for leadership. Exogenously increasing teams' demand for leadership results in performance improvements comparable to those seen with bonus incentives, rendering it as a likely mediator of incentive effects.
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收藏
页码:2695 / 2747
页数:53
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