How to promote carbon emission reduction in buildings? Evolutionary analysis of government regulation and financial investment

被引:4
|
作者
Wang, Wei [1 ]
Hao, Shaojie [1 ]
Zhong, Hua [2 ]
Sun, Zhi [3 ]
机构
[1] Yanshan Univ, Sch Civil Engn & Mech, Qinhuangdao 066000, Peoples R China
[2] London South Bank Univ, Sch Built Environm & Architecture, London SE1 0AA, England
[3] Minist Housing & Urban Rural Dev, Res Inst Stand & Norms, Beijing 10010, Peoples R China
来源
基金
英国自然环境研究理事会;
关键词
Carbon emission reduction; Government regulation; Construction enterprises; Market intervention; Evolutionary game; Numerical simulation; GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSIONS; SUPPLY CHAIN; INNOVATION EVIDENCE; CO2; EMISSIONS; GAME-THEORY; ENERGY; INTERVENTION; STRATEGIES; MANUFACTURERS; OPTIMIZATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jobe.2024.109279
中图分类号
TU [建筑科学];
学科分类号
0813 ;
摘要
Buildings account for a significant portion of global carbon emissions, necessitating strategies to accelerate decarbonisation in the construction sector. This research aims to analyse the behavioural strategies and interactions among governments, construction enterprises, and financial institutions in promoting building carbon emission reduction (CER) through an integrated regulatory and market-driven approach. A novel three-party evolutionary game model is developed that incorporates government regulation policies, the profit-driven nature of construction enterprises, and the investment incentives of financial institutions. Numerical simulations using MATLAB were performed to evaluate the dynamic replication and evolutionary stabilities of stakeholder strategies under different scenarios. Residential project M in Beijing was chosen as a realistic environment for simulation and analysis. The results demonstrate that stringent government regulation can incentivize financial institutions to increase their investments in CER initiatives. However, construction enterprises may still resist decarbonisation efforts if the costs outweigh the economic benefits. A two-pronged approach combining "command-and-control" regulation and "market-facilitation" interventions is proposed to effectively align stakeholder interests. This study provides valuable insights into leveraging both regulatory instruments and market-based incentives to drive the transition towards sustainable construction practises. Policy recommendations are offered to create an enabling environment that encourages the active participation of all stakeholders in achieving net-zero emission targets for buildings. The novelty lies in the development of an integrated tripartite evolutionary game framework that coherently captures the dynamics among regulators, industry players, and financial institutions, thus supporting low-carbon policymaking in the construction domain.
引用
收藏
页数:23
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] Evolutionary game analysis between service of public library and the investment of government
    Chen, Meijun
    Tian, Shuangliang
    Chen, Ping
    2015 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLIGENT HUMAN-MACHINE SYSTEMS AND CYBERNETICS IHMSC 2015, VOL I, 2015, : 191 - 194
  • [42] The Effect of the Carbon Tax and the Emission Reduction Fund on Government Salience
    Dunbar, Kirsty M.
    Wynder, Monte
    Baxter, Peter
    AUSTRALASIAN ACCOUNTING BUSINESS AND FINANCE JOURNAL, 2023, 17 (03) : 81 - 105
  • [43] Carbon emission reduction cooperation in supply chain with government subsidies
    Li, Zhimin
    Yang, Wen
    Pan, Yanchun
    6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ADVANCES IN ENERGY RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT ENGINEERING, 2021, 647
  • [44] Driving green: Financial benefits of carbon emission reduction in companies
    Ibishova, Banovsha
    Misund, Bard
    Tveteras, Ragnar
    INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, 2024, 96
  • [45] Carbon Emission Reduction Effect of China's Financial Decentralization
    Zhu, Fangzheng
    Lu, Yuexiang
    SUSTAINABILITY, 2022, 14 (22)
  • [46] Impact of three carbon emission reduction policies on carbon verification behavior: An analysis based on evolutionary game theory
    Wu, Xiaoping
    Liu, Peng
    Yang, Lin
    Shi, Zhuangfei
    Lao, Yongshuai
    ENERGY, 2024, 295
  • [47] The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis for Emission Reduction and Promotion in Low-Carbon Supply Chains
    Yuan, Baiyun
    He, Longfei
    Gu, Bingmei
    Zhang, Yi
    APPLIED SCIENCES-BASEL, 2018, 8 (10):
  • [48] Positive Analysis of the Relationship between China's Government Investment and Non-government Investment Under the Background of Financial Crisis
    Chen, Zhen-ling
    Wang, Xin-yu
    2011 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONICS, COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL (ICECC), 2011, : 3240 - 3242
  • [49] A systematic method for cost-effective carbon emission reduction in buildings
    Lawal, Musa
    Alwi, Sharifah Rafidah Wan
    Manan, Zainuddin Abdul
    Journal of Applied Sciences, 2012, 12 (11) : 1186 - 1190
  • [50] Carbon Footprint and Carbon Emission Reduction of Urban Buildings: A Case in Xiamen City, China
    Huang, Wei
    Li, Fei
    Cui, Sheng-hui
    Li, Fei
    Huang, Lizhen
    Lin, Jian-yi
    URBAN TRANSITIONS CONFERENCE, 2017, 198 : 1007 - 1017