How to promote carbon emission reduction in buildings? Evolutionary analysis of government regulation and financial investment

被引:4
|
作者
Wang, Wei [1 ]
Hao, Shaojie [1 ]
Zhong, Hua [2 ]
Sun, Zhi [3 ]
机构
[1] Yanshan Univ, Sch Civil Engn & Mech, Qinhuangdao 066000, Peoples R China
[2] London South Bank Univ, Sch Built Environm & Architecture, London SE1 0AA, England
[3] Minist Housing & Urban Rural Dev, Res Inst Stand & Norms, Beijing 10010, Peoples R China
来源
基金
英国自然环境研究理事会;
关键词
Carbon emission reduction; Government regulation; Construction enterprises; Market intervention; Evolutionary game; Numerical simulation; GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSIONS; SUPPLY CHAIN; INNOVATION EVIDENCE; CO2; EMISSIONS; GAME-THEORY; ENERGY; INTERVENTION; STRATEGIES; MANUFACTURERS; OPTIMIZATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jobe.2024.109279
中图分类号
TU [建筑科学];
学科分类号
0813 ;
摘要
Buildings account for a significant portion of global carbon emissions, necessitating strategies to accelerate decarbonisation in the construction sector. This research aims to analyse the behavioural strategies and interactions among governments, construction enterprises, and financial institutions in promoting building carbon emission reduction (CER) through an integrated regulatory and market-driven approach. A novel three-party evolutionary game model is developed that incorporates government regulation policies, the profit-driven nature of construction enterprises, and the investment incentives of financial institutions. Numerical simulations using MATLAB were performed to evaluate the dynamic replication and evolutionary stabilities of stakeholder strategies under different scenarios. Residential project M in Beijing was chosen as a realistic environment for simulation and analysis. The results demonstrate that stringent government regulation can incentivize financial institutions to increase their investments in CER initiatives. However, construction enterprises may still resist decarbonisation efforts if the costs outweigh the economic benefits. A two-pronged approach combining "command-and-control" regulation and "market-facilitation" interventions is proposed to effectively align stakeholder interests. This study provides valuable insights into leveraging both regulatory instruments and market-based incentives to drive the transition towards sustainable construction practises. Policy recommendations are offered to create an enabling environment that encourages the active participation of all stakeholders in achieving net-zero emission targets for buildings. The novelty lies in the development of an integrated tripartite evolutionary game framework that coherently captures the dynamics among regulators, industry players, and financial institutions, thus supporting low-carbon policymaking in the construction domain.
引用
收藏
页数:23
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction behavior strategies under government regulation
    Wei, Jie
    Li, Yining
    Liu, Yushun
    ENVIRONMENT DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY, 2024,
  • [2] Government regulation to promote coordinated emission reduction among enterprises in the green supply chain based on evolutionary game analysis
    Liu, Zheng
    Qian, Qingshan
    Hu, Bin
    Shang, Wen-Long
    Li, Lingling
    Zhao, Yuanjun
    Zhao, Zhao
    Han, Chunjia
    RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND RECYCLING, 2022, 182
  • [3] Carbon emission reduction behavior strategies in the shipping industry under government regulation: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis
    Meng, Lingpeng
    Liu, Kemeng
    He, Junliang
    Han, Chuanfeng
    Liu, Pihui
    JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2022, 378
  • [4] Evolutionary Game Analysis of Port and Shipping System Emission Reduction Under Government Regulation
    Li X.-D.
    Kuang H.-B.
    He H.-Y.
    Jiaotong Yunshu Xitong Gongcheng Yu Xinxi/Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2023, 23 (01): : 17 - 29
  • [5] Can government regulation, carbon-emission reduction certification and information publicity promote carpooling behavior?
    Si, Hongyun
    Su, Yangyue
    Wu, Guangdong
    Li, Wenxiang
    Cheng, Long
    TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART D-TRANSPORT AND ENVIRONMENT, 2022, 109
  • [6] Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy
    Yu, Na
    Chen, Jianghua
    Cheng, Lei
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND PUBLIC HEALTH, 2022, 19 (14)
  • [7] How to promote the Chinese Certified Emission Reduction scheme in the carbon market? A study based on tripartite evolutionary game model
    He, Yong
    Jiang, Ruipeng
    Liao, Nuo
    ENERGY, 2023, 285
  • [8] An Analysis of the Impact of Government Subsidies on Emission Reduction Technology Investment Strategies in Low-Carbon Port Operations
    Li, Minjie
    Luan, Jianlin
    Li, Xiaodong
    Jia, Peng
    SYSTEMS, 2024, 12 (04):
  • [9] Carbon emission reduction investment in sustainable supply chains under cap-and-trade regulation: An evolutionary game-theoretical perspective
    Kang, Kai
    Tan, Bing Qing
    EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH APPLICATIONS, 2023, 227
  • [10] How government green investment affects the carbon emission reduction process: empirical evidence from prefecture-level cities in China
    Pan, Ruoxi
    Hu, Yiguo
    Xu, Xiangbo
    Yuan, Naixiu
    Zhou, Kai
    FRONTIERS IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, 2023, 11