Cooperation strategy of port and shipping company under emission control

被引：0
|
作者：
Li X. [1 ,2 ]
Kuang H. [1 ,3 ]
Hu Y. [1 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Collaborative Innovation Center for Transport Studies, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian
[2] Transportation Engineering College, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian
[3] School of Maritime Economics and Management, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian
来源：
Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2021年 / 41卷 / 07期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Abatement investment; Emission control; Maritime cooperation; Maritime supply chain;
D O I：
10.12011/SETP2019-1091
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This study constructs a two-level maritime supply chain consisting of a single port and shipping company in view of their cooperation under the emission control. Four decision-making models were established, namely, port-led Stackelberg game, maritime vertical integration model, maritime Nash bargaining game and maritime coordination model; moreover, port price, abatement level, shipping companies' freight volume, and both parties' profits were examined. Results show that the profits of the port and shipping company under their vertical integration decision are greater than those under the port-led Stackelberg game. Moreover, revenue sharing contract cannot achieve the coordination of the maritime supply chain, whereas emission reduction cost sharing contract can improve the overall efficiency of the maritime supply chain and realize the overall Pareto improvement. Futhermore, port tends to make emission reduction cost-sharing decisions, whereas shipping companies tend to join the Nash bargaining game. However, because the latter's overall profit and abatement level are higher than the former, the government should encourage the port to accept the maritime Nash bargaining game. © 2021, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：1750 / 1760
页数：10
相关论文
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