Condorcet-loser dominance between the plurality rule and other scoring rules

被引：0

作者：

Doi, Ryoga ^{[1
]}

Okamoto, Noriaki ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Keio Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Tokyo 1088345, Japan

[2] Meiji Gakuin Univ, Dept Econ, 1-2-37 Shirokanedai,Minato Ku, Tokyo 1088636, Japan

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2024年 / 237卷

基金：

日本学术振兴会;

关键词：

Borda rule; Plurality rule; Scoring rules; Condorcet loser;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111652

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a voting model with three alternatives, we show that for any non-Borda scoring rule, there exists at least one preference profile under which the scoring rule selects a Condorcet loser, whereas the plurality rule does not.

引用

页数：3

共 3 条

[1] Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: A characterization of the plurality with a runoff
Sato, Shin
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 2016, 79 : 11 - 19
[2] Characterizing plurality using the majoritarian condition: a new proof and implications for other scoring rules
Jac C. Heckelman
Public Choice, 2021, 189 : 335 - 346
[3] Characterizing plurality using the majoritarian condition: a new proof and implications for other scoring rules
Heckelman, Jac C.
PUBLIC CHOICE, 2021, 189 (3-4) : 335 - 346

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