SEPARATION OF POWERS BY CONTRACT: RESHAPES PRESIDENTIAL POWER

被引:0
|
作者
Handler, Nicholas [1 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Law Sch, Law, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
This Article demonstrates for the first time how civil servants check and restrain presidential power through collective bargaining. The executive branch is typically depicted as a top-down hierarchy. The President, as chief executive, issues policy directives, and the tenured bureaucracy of civil servants below him follow them. This presumed top-down structure shapes many influential critiques of the modern administrative state. Proponents of a strong President decry civil servants as an unelected "deep state" usurping popular will. Skeptics of presidential power fear the growth of an imperial presidency, held in check by an impartial bureaucracy.
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页码:45 / 127
页数:83
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