The Structure of Charles Taylor′s Philosophy

The aim of this paper is to show how systematic Charles Taylor ' s philosophy is. It rejects two opposite readings: one claiming that Taylor ' s thought is too diverse to have real unity; the other, that it is the product of a '' monomaniac '' (Taylor ' s own word). I claim that his thought has a very distinct structure, comprising two levels. On the first, '' meta-hermeneutic '' level, Taylor defends a thesis about hermeneutics (namely, that it cannot be dispensed with): this unifies his anthropology, epistemology, moral philosophy, philosophy of language and political philosophy. On the second, '' hermeneutic '' level, Taylor builds an impressive historic construal of modern identity and its dilemmas. More importantly, while these two levels are irreducibly distinct, they relate to each other in interesting ways, giving Taylor ' s philosophy its systematicity. I finally confront this view with other readings, and argue that it is the best way to understand Taylor ' s work.