MAXMIN AND MINMAX FOR COALITIONAL GAME FORMS

被引:0
|
作者
ABDOU, J [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV PARIS 01,CERMSEM,UFR MATH,F-75634 PARIS 13,FRANCE
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0899-8256(91)90028-D
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We introduce the polar and the support function of a coalitional game form (effectivity function) which is closed convex valued. Polarity is an operation which allows one to find the minmax distribution of power from an original maxmin one; the support function is a measure of the worth of coalitions. A concept of value is also introduced. We apply these tools to prove with elementary methods that the correlated β-effectivity function (and the β-NTU game) associated to a game form is superadditive. © 1991.
引用
收藏
页码:267 / 277
页数:11
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