RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES AND RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT CARTELS
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KAMIEN, MI
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TEL AVIV UNIV,LEON RECANATI GRAD SCH BUSINESS ADM,FAC MANAGEMENT,IL-69978 TEL AVIV,ISRAELTEL AVIV UNIV,LEON RECANATI GRAD SCH BUSINESS ADM,FAC MANAGEMENT,IL-69978 TEL AVIV,ISRAEL
KAMIEN, MI
[1
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MULLER, E
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TEL AVIV UNIV,LEON RECANATI GRAD SCH BUSINESS ADM,FAC MANAGEMENT,IL-69978 TEL AVIV,ISRAELTEL AVIV UNIV,LEON RECANATI GRAD SCH BUSINESS ADM,FAC MANAGEMENT,IL-69978 TEL AVIV,ISRAEL
MULLER, E
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ZANG, I
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TEL AVIV UNIV,LEON RECANATI GRAD SCH BUSINESS ADM,FAC MANAGEMENT,IL-69978 TEL AVIV,ISRAELTEL AVIV UNIV,LEON RECANATI GRAD SCH BUSINESS ADM,FAC MANAGEMENT,IL-69978 TEL AVIV,ISRAEL
ZANG, I
[1
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机构:
[1] TEL AVIV UNIV,LEON RECANATI GRAD SCH BUSINESS ADM,FAC MANAGEMENT,IL-69978 TEL AVIV,ISRAEL
We analyze the effects of R&D cartelization and research joint ventures on firms that engage in either Cournot or Bertrand competition in their product market. Research efforts, which precede production, are directed to reducing unit cost and are subject to various degrees of spillovers. It is shown that creating a competitive research joint venture reduces the equilibrium level of technological improvement and increases equilibrium prices compared to when firms conduct R&D independently. A research joint venture that cooperates in its R&D decisions yields the highest consumer plus producer surplus under Cournot competition and, in most cases, under Bertrand competition.