OPTIMAL AUDITING, INSURANCE, AND REDISTRIBUTION

被引:209
|
作者
MOOKHERJEE, D [1 ]
PNG, I [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024
来源
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1989年 / 104卷 / 02期
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2937855
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:399 / 415
页数:17
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