The Most-Favored-Nation Clause: A Menace to World Peace

被引：1

|

作者：

Hauser, Henri

机构：

来源：

ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE | 1931年 / 156卷

关键词：

D O I：

10.1177/000271623115600114

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

引用

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页码：101 / 106

页数：6

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