On the Robustness of the High-Quality Advantage under Vertical Differentiation

被引:0
|
作者
Schmidt, Robert C. [1 ]
机构
[1] Humboldt Univ, Inst Offentl Finanzen Wettbewerb & Inst 2, Spandauer Str 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany
来源
关键词
vertical differentiation; high-quality advantage; maximum differentiation; covered market equilibrium; non-linearity;
D O I
10.1007/s10842-006-0029-8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The idea that the high-quality provider in a vertically differentiated duopoly earns the higher profit (the so-called Bhigh-quality advantage") appears to be an established fact among economists. This note shows that the high-quality advantage is not a robust feature of vertical differentiation models. A low-quality advantage can be predicted under perfectly plausible assumptions, such as a concave utility-quality and/or a convex unit cost-quality relation. The existence of a high-or a low-quality advantage depends on the nature of the firms' strategic interaction.
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页码:183 / 193
页数:11
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