HOW NOT TO PAY FOR THE WAR

被引:2
|
作者
WOLFSON, M
SMITH, R
机构
[1] UNIV CALIF IRVINE, IRVINE, CA 92717 USA
[2] IRVINE VALLEY COLL, IRVINE, CA USA
来源
DEFENCE ECONOMICS | 1993年 / 4卷 / 04期
关键词
GULF WAR; BURDEN SHARING; GAMES BETWEEN ALLIES; UNITED-STATES DEFENSE POLICY;
D O I
10.1080/10430719308404770
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
As a result of allied subsidy and the influence of sunk costs, the marginal cost of the Gulf War to the US was reduced to negligible size. This result is at variance with the Olson-Zeckhauser thesis that in an alliance ''the small exploit the large.'' A game theoretic alternative explanation suggests that the relation between allies resembles the game of Chicken, successfully played by the US. The ability to shift the marginal costs of war in the short term raises questions about the possible underestimation of long term effects.
引用
收藏
页码:299 / 314
页数:16
相关论文
共 50 条