THE LEXICOGRAPHIC EGALITARIAN SOLUTION ON ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS

被引:0
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作者
NIETO, J
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F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper considers solutions to distribution problems defined on economic environments. It shows that there is a unique resource-egalitarian and symmetric solution that proposes always Pareto optimal allocations and satisfies Inidivual Restricted Monotonicity; this property requires the poor people of the society to be strictly better-off when social resources increase and the initial outcome is a welfare unequal position. That unique solution is the lexicographic extension of the maxmin criterion.
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页码:203 / 212
页数:10
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