Political parties: insights from a tri-planar model of political economy

被引:4
|
作者
Hebert, David J. [1 ]
Wagner, Richard E. [2 ]
机构
[1] Aquinas Coll, Dept Econ, Grand Rapids, MI 49506 USA
[2] George Mason Univ, Dept Econ, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
关键词
Political parties as interest groups; Common versus specialized knowledge; Agenda manipulation; Divided knowledge; Ideology; Democratic oligarchy;
D O I
10.1007/s10602-018-9256-3
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
What is the place of political parties within a democratic system of political economy? Parties are often described as intermediaries that lubricate the political process by facilitating the matching of voter preferences with candidate positions. This line of analysis flows from a bi-planar model of the political process where politicians appeal directly to voters. In this paper, we examine how construction of a meso level of analysis that lies between micro and macro levels might influence the relationship between candidates and voters. This meso level interjects such organizations as political parties between candidates and voters, with those organizations comprising interest groups within a democratic process, as against serving simply as neutral intermediaries. In this case, political parties can exert substantive effects on democratic outcomes as they take on characteristics of interest groups, bringing to mind Michels (Political parties: a sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy, Hearst's International Library, New York, 1915) analysis of the unavoidably oligopolistic nature of democratic political organization.
引用
收藏
页码:253 / 267
页数:15
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Political parties. From society to the State
    Perel, Gerardo Scherlis
    [J]. IBEROAMERICANA, 2008, 8 (32): : 166 - 167
  • [32] A computational political economy model of transition
    Jackson, JE
    [J]. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSITION AND DEVELOPMENT: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND POLICIES, 2003, 5 : 117 - 137
  • [33] A political economy model of congressional careers
    Diermeier, D
    Keane, M
    Merlo, A
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2005, 95 (01): : 347 - 373
  • [34] A political economy model of market intervention
    Francisco Candel-Sánchez
    Juan Perote-Peña
    [J]. Public Choice, 2013, 157 : 169 - 181
  • [35] A political economy model of market intervention
    Candel-Sanchez, Francisco
    Perote-Pena, Juan
    [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 2013, 157 (1-2) : 169 - 181
  • [36] A political economy model of road pricing
    De Borger, Bruno
    Proost, Stef
    [J]. JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS, 2012, 71 (01) : 79 - 92
  • [37] Political parties and deliberation: from challenges to opportunities
    Gherghina, Sergiu
    Soare, Sorina
    Jacquet, Vincent
    [J]. ACTA POLITICA, 2023, 58 (03) : 487 - 494
  • [38] Italian political parties from Unification to the present
    Scornajenghi, A
    [J]. RASSEGNA STORICA DEL RISORGIMENTO, 2002, 89 (03) : 445 - 452
  • [39] Political parties and deliberation: from challenges to opportunities
    Sergiu Gherghina
    Sorina Soare
    Vincent Jacquet
    [J]. Acta Politica, 2023, 58 : 487 - 494
  • [40] A political economy model of immigration quotas
    Amegashie J.A.
    [J]. Economics of Governance, 2004, 5 (3) : 255 - 267