THE WINNERS CURSE AND PUBLIC INFORMATION IN COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS - REPLY

被引：1

作者：

KAGEL, JH ^{[1
]}

LEVIN, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV HOUSTON,DEPT ECON,HOUSTON,TX 77204

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1991年 / 81卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：362 / 369

页数：8

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