Domestic entry, optimum-welfare and maximum-revenue tariffs

被引:4
|
作者
Wang, Leonard F. S. [1 ]
Lee, Jen-Yao [2 ]
机构
[1] Natl Univ Kaohsiung, Dept Appl Econ, 700 Kaohsiung Univ Rd, Kaohsiung 811, Taiwan
[2] Natl Kaohsiung Univ Appl Sci, Dept Int Business, Kaohsiung 807, Taiwan
关键词
Cournot competition; Free entry; Tariff ranking;
D O I
10.1016/j.rie.2011.07.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this paper, we examine the ranking of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff under a linear Cournot oligopoly model without and with free entry of domestic firms. We demonstrate that in a regulated entry oligopoly with asymmetric costs, when the marginal cost of the domestic firms exceeds a critical value, the maximum-revenue tariff is higher than the optimum-welfare tariff. We then show that under free entry of domestic firms with asymmetric costs, when the fixed cost gets larger and the domestic firms become fewer, the difference between the optimum-welfare tariff and the maximum-revenue tariff becomes larger. (c) 2011 University of Venice. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:106 / 109
页数:4
相关论文
共 27 条