THE FOLK THEOREM FOR FINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH MIXED STRATEGIES

被引:26
|
作者
GOSSNER, O
机构
[1] L.S.T.A, Boîte 158, Université Paris 6, Paris, 75005
关键词
D O I
10.1007/BF01258206
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper proves a Folk Theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies. To obtain this result, we first show a similar property for finitely repeated games with terminal payoffs.
引用
收藏
页码:95 / 107
页数:13
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