THE FOLK THEOREM FOR FINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH MIXED STRATEGIES

被引：26

作者：

GOSSNER, O

机构：

[1] L.S.T.A, Boîte 158, Université Paris 6, Paris, 75005

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1995年 / 24卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01258206

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper proves a Folk Theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies. To obtain this result, we first show a similar property for finitely repeated games with terminal payoffs.

引用

页码：95 / 107

页数：13

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