Are Involved Parents Providing Public Goods or Private Goods?

被引:10
|
作者
Walsh, Patrick [1 ]
机构
[1] St Michaels Coll, Econ, Colchester, VT 05446 USA
关键词
parental involvement; school resource allocation; gifted programs;
D O I
10.1177/1091142107308298
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Parents who lobby their children's schools for better or increased educational resources may be providing a schoolwide public good. However, they may also be capturing a larger share of school resources, possibly leaving other families worse off. A regression of within-school variation in input quality on parent-initiated school contact identifies this "private-good'' effect, using involvement in civic organizations to instrument for contact. A 10 percent increase in the probability of parental contact raises the probability of inclusion in a gifted program by 2 percent to 3 percent. At the average school, the highest "non-gifted'' students significantly outscore the lowest "gifted'' students, suggesting that this lobbying crowds out deserving students. Alongside these private-good effects, involved parents also provide public goods: again instrumenting with civic involvement, higher participation in a school's parent-teacher organization leads to a higher probability that principals frequently observe and evaluate all teachers at that school.
引用
收藏
页码:678 / 705
页数:28
相关论文
共 50 条