MORAL HAZARD, LIMITED-LIABILITY AND TAXATION - A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL

被引：4

作者：

BANERJEE, A ^{[1
]}

BESLEY, T ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] PRINCETON UNIV,WOODROW WILSON SCH,DEPT ECON,PRINCETON,NJ 08544

来源：

OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES | 1990年 / 42卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041943

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：46 / 60

页数：15

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