A NOTE ON BALANCEDNESS AND NONEMPTINESS OF THE CORE IN VOTING GAMES

被引：4
|
作者：
LEBRETON, M
机构：
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1989年 / 18卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1007/BF01248498
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：111 / 117
页数：7
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