AS SPINOZA'S GOD THINKS? (TO THE PROBLEM OF THE NOTION RES IN NATURA NATURATA)

被引:0
|
作者
Sedychenko, Tatiana Y. [1 ]
机构
[1] RAS, SB, Inst Philosophy & Law, Novosibirsk, Russia
关键词
ontology; substance; attributes; modes; natura naturata; res; the idea of God; God; thinking; intelligence; motion; rest;
D O I
10.17223/1998863X/36/26
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
Spinoza understands the modes of movement /rest, and the intellect (mind) as one and the same mode of being considered under different attributes. We suggest to understand these modes as the tool by which god continuously generates the world. By means of movement and the rest there is a formation and change of things, and by means of reason there is a formation and change of ideas. The intellect is the first infinite mode of thinking. Spinoza speaks about one more infinite mode (res), about idea of god. This idea is that god "represents" about himself. It follows from attribute of thinking, and out of it through the intellect follows all ideas. If intelligence is only the tool for generation of ideas (and motion and rest is the tool for generation of things), that the idea of god represents their unity, or a substratum. Such idea is the first idea of attribute of thinking. It initially contains in an objective form only attributes, without modes. Idea of god and intellect of god are two different res with similar quality: the idea of god follows from attribute of thinking before the intellect and, therefore, initially in itself doesn't contain ideas. The infinite intellect generated by substance is the tool for formation of ideas and so doesn't comprise ideas. They are only formed by means of it in attribute of thinking. Therefore it is impossible to tell that god or substance "thinks" of something like the person. When Spinoza says that "god thinks infinitely of a lot of things", he means that it is existence and transformation of infinitely many modes (ideas) in attribute of thinking. At the same time, we understand "thinking" of substance not only as formation and change of ideas in attribute of thinking, but also as the continuous approval by substance of existence something in her (i.e. in the attribute of extension). "Thinking" of god can't "perceive" things as objects for cognition (as something external), because attributes of thinking and extension is a one whole. Therefore substance (god, nature) can't be the knowing subject. Material objects of ideas (i.e. things) about which Spinoza writes, exist only for the person. Thus, we define "cognition" or "thinking" of substance as subjectless formation, transformation and change of the "ideas" in attribute of thinking, which approve all variety of the infinite states, occurring both in attribute of thinking, and in other attributes.
引用
收藏
页码:250 / 259
页数:10
相关论文
共 50 条