AUDIT CLASSES AND TAX ENFORCEMENT POLICY

被引：4

|

作者：

SCOTCHMER, S

机构：

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1987年 / 77卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：229 / 233

页数：5

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