EXCESS CAPACITY AND COLLUSION

被引：97
|
作者：
DAVIDSON, C [1 ]
DENECKERE, R [1 ]
机构：
[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201
来源：
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1990年 / 31卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2527159
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：521 / 541
页数：21
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