Phenomenal Knowledge without Phenomenal Concepts? On Jesse Prinz' Theory of Mental Pointers

The aim of the present paper is to present and criticize the reply of Jesse Prinz (2007) to the "knowledge argument" proposed by Jackson (1982). Prinz' proposal relies on two tenets: in the first place, it is supported by an original neurocognitive theory about consciousness; in the second place, it rests on a philosophical theory about phenomenal knowledge that seems to avoid the supposition of phenomenal concepts (versus Loar, Tye and Papineau, inter alia). I argue that Prinz' proposal is inadequate both on empirical grounds - concerning his theory of consciousness - and on more conceptual grounds concerning his conception of phenomenal knowledge. I conclude that the postulation of phenomenal concepts seems to be unavoidable in order to explain the nature of phenomenal knowledge.