The European Union's economic strategy on Russia had not been clearly and consistently worked out by the time of the 2004 May enlargement; major questions still needed to be answered. Since new member-states had not been really involved into the process of shaping EU policy toward its 'strategic partner,' their approaches should be also included into the EU Russia-policy in the future. Though enlargement certainly brings about growing importance and new perspectives into the EU-Russia dialog, it will create new problems or deepen some old ones as well. Beside Baltic-states, that have their special interests and attitudesVisegrad-countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and to a less degree the Czech Republic) are the most interested new-members in this dialog. They may turn to be either the most active ones in taking part of shaping EU-Russian economic and political dialog from among the 10 newcomers or the most influential ones in doing so. The role of Poland in this process is undoubtedly unique. Notwithstanding the fact that characteristics of bilateral economic relations (Polish-Russian, Hungarian-Russian, etc.) are common to a great extent, it seems to be unlikely that these countries will intend or will be able to cooperate on this issue. The reasons for potential and already sen-sible divergence in their attitudes toward Russia-contrary to their more or less similar approaches regarding Ukraine-are rooted more in politics then in different economic interests. Analysing figures concerning bilateral trade and investment flows indicates these common features. Energy is in the focus of Russian-Visegrad4 economic relations. (C) 2005 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.