INCENTIVES FOR COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE R-AND-D IN DUOPOLY

被引:43
|
作者
MARJIT, S
机构
[1] Jadavpur University, Calcutta
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0165-1765(91)90129-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper tries to explain why duopolistic firms would like to enter cooperative R and D venture even when they would act non-cooperatively in the product market. We show that both 'very high' and 'very low' probabilities of success in R and D can induce firms to go for R and D joint ventures. This research highlights the modus operandi for cooperative research even without and 'spillover' of individual R and D and/or with a reasonably 'low' sunk cost of R and D. © 1991.
引用
收藏
页码:187 / 191
页数:5
相关论文
共 50 条