The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Universalization of the Additional Protocol

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been under serious strain for nearly two decades since the 'discovery' after the 1991 Gulf War of the clandestine development of nuclear weapons in Iraq. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors responded to the revelation by adopting the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, which would give the IAEA a much broader power than the comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA) and would provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities on the territories of its parties. However, the universalization of the Additional Protocol is still a distant goal. This article first considers whether one can argue that the conclusion and bringing into force of an additional protocol is an obligation under the NPT. It then discusses the ways and means to make the Additional Protocol universal. Such ways and means may take the form of a direct call for the conclusion of an additional protocol. Its universalization may also be pursued indirectly by requiring a State to conclude an additional protocol as a condition for benefiting in nuclear cooperation. Legal possibilities and limitations are explored for both of these (direct and indirect) approaches. In doing so, an analysis of the relevant discussions at the 2010 NPT Review Conference held in May 2010 in New York is also provided.