Anti-Trafficking Interventions in Nigeria and the Principal-Agent Aid Model

被引:0
|
作者
Nwogu, Victoria I. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] GAATW, Budapest, Hungary
[2] CEU, Dept Legal Studies, Course Human Rights Africa Special Focus Gender I, Budapest, Hungary
来源
ANTI-TRAFFICKING REVIEW | 2014年 / 03期
关键词
Nigeria; NAPTIP; WOTCLEF; WOCON; IOM; UNODC; UNICEF; principal-agent; accountability; anti-trafficking; funding;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
DF [法律]; D9 [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
Following the rising profile of trafficking in persons globally and Nigeria's position as a critical country in the African region, significant-though insufficient and poorly spentfunding has been deployed towards tackling the problem. This funding, however, is provided in a 'principal-agent' relationship by donors to the government of Nigeria and anti-trafficking organisations. Donors (the principals) fund organisations (the agents) to do work they deem important, though organisations tend to have significantly different needs and preferences for the funding. The consequence is that interventions paid for by these funds are 'not fit for purpose', making their outcomes often invisible, undesirable or unsustainable. An ancillary and critical issue related to anti-trafficking funding in Nigeria is accountability, or rather a lack of accountability. Where key actors in addressing trafficking are not accountable to beneficiaries, they miss out on critical feedback to help them improve services or design appropriate interventions.
引用
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页码:41 / 63
页数:23
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