INFRASTRUCTURAL COMPETITION AMONG JURISDICTIONS

被引:28
|
作者
TAYLOR, L
机构
[1] Economics Department, Tulane University, New Orleans
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0047-2727(92)90022-8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper models jurisdictions that compete for an industry by building infrastructure more rapidly than their identical neighbors. Such competition can waste resources. Lucrative 'prizes' - the tax revenues and the value of jobs that an incoming firm would provide - stimulate infrastructural spending and waste. Low initial levels of infrastructure discourage infrastructural competition. The paper urges a cautious approach toward federal subsidies of local expenditures on infrastructure.
引用
收藏
页码:241 / 259
页数:19
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