THE DYNAMICS OF THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM IN TAKEOVERS

被引:14
|
作者
HARRINGTON, JE
PROKOP, J
机构
[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,KELLOGG GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,DEPT MANAGEMENT & STRATEGY,EVANSTON,IL 60208
[2] JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV,BALTIMORE,MD 21218
来源
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 1993年 / 6卷 / 04期
关键词
D O I
10.1093/rfs/6.4.851
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We explore the dynamics of a takeover bid. In contrast to preceding models, if the initial takeover bid is unsuccessful a raider is allowed to make a new tender offer in order to try and secure the remaining shares. Numerical analysis shows that the raider's tender offer rises over time as be accumulates more shares. The anticipation of a higher tender offer in the future makes shareholders more inclined to bold their shares and forces the raider to offer a higher premium than is predicted by static theories. As the time between tender offers goes to zero, we show analytically that the expected profit from engaging in a takeover goes to zero.
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页码:851 / 882
页数:32
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