IN-KIND AND OUT-OF-KIND PENALTIES - PREFERENCE AND VALUATION

Utilitarian and economic theories of deterrence hold that the relation of the penalty to the misdeed should be irrelevant. In 5 experiments using hypothetical cases, judgments of penalties depended on whether this relation was in kind (IK) or out of kind (OK). When victims were identifiable, IK penalties were higher than OK and preferred to OK. Subjects seemed to confuse penalties and compensation. When there were no identifiable victims (e.g., environmental damage), IK penalties were preferred, but OK penalties were higher. Here, OK judgments were more uncertain, and subjects preferred to err on the side of overpunishing. The results can be explained in terms of overgeneralization of usually useful heuristics. Alternative hypotheses concerning aggression and scale compatibility are rejected. The findings have implications for the setting of penalties in legal cases (e.g., the Exxon Valdez) and for lay theories of punishment in nonlegal settings.