Wittgenstein's Tractatus: Saying and Showing

My paper focuses on saying/showing distinction in Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". My purpose is to discuss what grounds and consequences this distinction has. I start with a brief review of two opposing views on the Tractatus, which sets the context of any discussion on the Tractatus. Then, I examine the meaning of saying/showing distinction, and divide what can be said from what can be shown. After this, I consider the most important characteristic of showing, and what conditions must be met for showing to be possible, more precisely, how language should be arranged in order to showing become possible. After that, I examine what will happen if we violate the conditions which made showing possible. Finally, I want to consider the strongest objection to my argument, and in the end I, based on my argument, decide which one of two opposing views on the Tractatus is more reasonable.