The model of moral motivation as developed by Brekke et al. (2003) is analysed with the new assumption that self-image is an increasing function of effort. While the effects of increased efficiency and new information on optimal effort levels are similar, different results are obtained when individuals are faced with volunteering opportunities with and without non-participation fees. Most significantly, participation is sustainable as a Nash equilibrium even when it is not considered morally ideal. All results adhere to previously established theories on responsibility and crowding-out.
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Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USAStanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Fried, Ohad
Jacobs, Jennifer
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Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Media Arts & Technol, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Express Computat Lab, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USAStanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Jacobs, Jennifer
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机构:
Finkelstein, Adam
Agrawala, Maneesh
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Stanford Univ, Comp Sci, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Stanford Univ, Brown Inst Media Innovat, Stanford, CA 94305 USAStanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA