The work is divided into two parts. The first part deals with theoretical principles of voucher privatization. A remarkable correspondence of scenario of a privatizing wave of voucher privatization with the process of Walrasian tatonnement by which an economy finds in auction way its competitive aquilibrium. Both similarities and differences are discussed. Among similarities, at the top there is an effort of the state to "sell out" among participants in voucher privatization property of joint-stock companies basically by auction method, where the Center of voucher privatization plays in principle the same role as Walrasian auctioneer: with excess supply the price is going down and with excess demand in turn it is going up. Some different featrues are, however, also substantial. The first of them is the asymmetric aporoach to excess supply and demand. In case of excess demand one proceeds in the same way as Walrasian auctioneer: orders of a given stock are cancelled and the same number of stocks moves on to the following round with an increased "point price". If there, however, at the given "point price" supply exceeds demand so all the voucher holders can be satisfied - the number of stocks moves on to the following round reduced by quantity of settled orders. This fact is an element of discriminating price formation which makes impossible to find equilibrium price relations. One also points out the fact that the privatization wave resembles an auction with long breaks. Under this situation it is unrealistic to assume that the demand curve of participants in a privatization wave remains between two privatization rounds unchanged. In contrast, considerable shifts can be expected. One must not either forget the strategic behavior consisting in the requirement that decisions of some economic agents must take into account decisions of the others. The economic theory has been employing applies the model approach of the theory of games which demonstrates impossibility to describe the outcomes in a simple way using supply and demand curvers only. The second part has stressed the fact that the voucher privatization, characterized as, a non-standard method of privatization, creates also non-standard departures for capital market. There is a complicating factor in relation to investment vouchers holders - it is the fact that the initial disbelief of citizens in investing into vouchers was not broken by enlightening which would transform common savers into investors, but by an aggressive advertizing campaign of some privatizing funds. At the side of privatization funds there is a lack of practical experience as a guidance for evaluating performance of the funds at administration of stocks given in charge. And finally there is a question of underlying macroeconomic conditions when the Czechoslovak economy is expected to live through the hard period of restructuring with a possibility of bankruptcy of many enterprises just privatized.
