What's in it for me? - An analysis of environmental investments through a game theoretic lens

被引:1
|
作者
Mueller, David [1 ]
机构
[1] Brandenburg Univ Technol Cottbus Senftenberg, Management Accounting & Control, POB 101344, D-03013 Cottbus, Germany
关键词
environmental management; fairness; cooperative game theory; Shapley value; nucleolus; tau-value;
D O I
10.1504/IJISD.2016.075551
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Investments in clean technology are cost-intensive and risky, so cost- and risk-sharing between several firms is a rational option. As each company strives for the largest possible share of gain, the question arises of how the jointly generated benefit should be shared. A mechanism is sought that is judged to be fair and is therefore accepted by the partners. Several solution mechanisms are available if such investments are interpreted as a cooperative game. The nature, characteristics and calculation of these mechanisms are discussed in this paper. Moreover, the most important properties of cooperative games are presented. Different solution concepts will be discussed and their (dis-)advantages are highlighted.
引用
收藏
页码:198 / 218
页数:21
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