Political Business Cycle in Taiwan-Evidence from Central Government Expenditures

被引:2
|
作者
Hung, Ling-Chun [1 ]
Hsieh, Yu-Tou [1 ]
机构
[1] Shih Hsin Univ, Dept Publ Policy & Management, Taipei, Taiwan
关键词
Central elections; government expenditure; political business cycle; public finance; Taiwan;
D O I
10.1080/01900692.2015.1004089
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
The political business cycle (PBC) refers to the phenomenon of an incumbent utilizing fiscal or monetary policies to create an economic boom before an election so that periodic fluctuations are induced according to election calendars. This article uses panel data from 1992 to 2010 to examine the effect of presidential elections on central government departmental expenditure in Taiwan. The results suggest an opportunistic PBC in Taiwan after the first Taiwanese presidential direct election in 1996. Furthermore, Taiwan's government expenditure cycles have been significantly stronger in the years of the "new democracy."
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页码:249 / 257
页数:9
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