Since the 1991 Constitution, most rulings and sentences tend to consider that individuals in charge of the local executive power (mayors, governors) should be some sort of tuling aldermen responsible for their particular territories and their "controlled decentralization" instead of actual governing actors, advocates and defenders of the governance of their territories. This fact raises the questions of why and how they can possibly play this double role. The bulk of the answer to this question can be found by examining both the logic behind public policies (Muller) and the conditions in whixh these are implemented in each territory, or "territorial deployment" (Medellin). According to Muller, the territoriality of a particular public policy refers to a situation whereby the prevailing logic is territorial or horizontal (regulation of a geographical territory follows a center-periphery scheme), whereas its sectoriality refers to a situation whereby the prevailing logic is sectorial or vertical (regulation of a sector's reproduction is vertically determined by a global-sectorial scheme). For each regulation logic behind public policies there is a corresponding way of governing a particular territory: governing the territory for the sake of sectoriality, and governing it for the sake of territoriality. As opposed to the French case, whereby the construction of the State signals the purposes of a territorial logic ("traditional territoriality"), the Colombian State is na endemic one, a fragmented State struggling for territorial control and in fear of the fragmentation of territorial unity (Navas). Its limited capacity to cover the whole territory and to act on it (its "limited or partial territoriality", according to Medellin) affects governability as well as the deployment of public policies, which is frequently subject to uncertain negotiations related to the problem of governance. That es why governability in Colombia is only possible through hybrid public policies, which are in turn the result of the "indissoluble marriage between sectoriality and territoriality", the result of a sort of "secterritoriality" which combines in various proportions a sectorial logic (or sectoriallity, which implies centralization) and a territorial logic (or territoriallity, which implies decentralization), all due to a hybrid form of governmen, or "governance" of the territory, a complex and variable dosage of both government and governance. Keeping this in mind, it is possible to establish the degree of territoriality and sectoriality of a public policy at a particular time, and to classify public policies according to their degree of territoriality and/or sectoriality, that is, according to the relative importance of the logics behind their regulation. From the early 70s to the early 80s, sectoriality prevailed and governability was guaranteed almost exclusively through the separate territorial deployment of each sector, then, from 1984 to the present, "controlled decentralization" has shown partial changes in the regulation logic behind public policies by resorting, at least in part, to a logic of territoriality in response to some sort of sectorriality crisis. As can be clearly seen after analyzing and evaluatin public policies in matters such as state subsidized housing, municipal land development and legislation, education, water and sewage services, governability during this second period can only be guaranteed by governance in the territories or by a combination of both, government in the territory and governance in the territories. In other words, governability is possible thanks to a type of hybrid government that allows those in charge of exercising local executive power to reconcile their bias towards the governance of their teritories and their duties vis-vis the government of the territory, but capable of being, at the same time, governing actors and ruling agents, active modern-day aldermen.
