Channel coordination mechanisms for customer satisfaction

被引:122
|
作者
Chu, WJ [1 ]
Desai, PS [1 ]
机构
[1] PURDUE UNIV, KRANNERT GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT, W LAFAYETTE, IN 47907 USA
关键词
channels of distribution; customer satisfaction; incentives; game theory;
D O I
10.1287/mksc.14.4.343
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider two broad categories of incentives by which a manufacturer can motivate its retailers to provide high customer satisfaction: (1) manufacturer assistance that reduces the retailer's cost of providing customer satisfaction (CS assistance); and (2) customer satisfaction index (CSI) bonus. We show that if a retailer has a long-term orientation, CS assistance is a more effective coordination mechanism that induces the retailer to expend more effort at customer satisfaction. However, if the retailer has a short-term orientation, CSI bonus is a more effective coordination mechanism. We then show that a long-term oriented retailer is more valuable to a manufacturer than a short-term oriented one. Finally, we show that the use of CS incentives results in greater profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer.
引用
收藏
页码:343 / 359
页数:17
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