LIABILITY AND THE INCENTIVE TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT RISK

被引：64

作者：

SHAVELL, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NATL BUR ECON RES, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES | 1992年 / 21卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/467907

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：259 / 270

页数：12

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