SECTARIAN CONFLICT IN PAKISTAN: SOME LESSONS FROM THE IRISH EXPERIENCE

This paper attempts to examine the dynamics of sectarian conflict in Pakistan in the context of lessons that may be learned from the Irish experience. The application of conflict resolution (CR) in the context of Pakistan and Northern Ireland raises two arguments: First, in both cases, the resolution of conflict is yet to take place and second, pending issues seem to be impeding the final settlement. The CR process in case of Pakistan is more complicated as unlike Northern Ireleand, where a substantive agreement in the shape of Good Friday Agreement (GFA) mediated by the then US President Bill Clinton in April 1998 exists, no substantive effort has been made to establish a mechanism for durable peace between the Shi'a and Sunni communities. Case studies of the conflicts in the two countries can provide a conceptual framework for the application of conflict management (CM) as a viable approach for disengaging the conflicting parties and allowing them a cooling off period pending a final settlement. The lessons learned from the management of the Irish conflict can be of great help to those who are involved in seeking a better understanding of the sectarian conflict in Pakistan. These lessons are: first the conflicting parties have the political will to sit down and talk, second, adoption of a moderate approach by the Irish Republican Army and the Unionist party and third, readiness to accept third party mediation. The Irish example also shows the way for the transformation of sectarian conflict in Pakistan from a high to a low intensity conflict.